Compensation to Imran Khan from the Supreme Court — which on Thursday called his arrest “illegal” — and the Islamabad High Court, which on Friday granted him general bail in all cases for two weeks, is not the end of Pakistan’s internal chaos. If anything, it sets the stage for a new round in this 20-month-old conflict that began with the former prime minister eyeing the military over the appointment of a new ISI chief: Imran wanted to keep the ancient, but it flashed first.
All the while, Pakistan’s legendary cricket captain has been careful not to frame his battle as one against the military, but as one against the individual officers he holds responsible for his ouster last year. He has blamed former army chief Qamar Javed Bajwa (along with the Biden Administration and opposition parties); alleges that an ISI officer was the mastermind behind the assassination attempt on him last year; and sees the current chief, General Asim Munir, as a continuation of Bajwa’s conspiracy to prevent him from returning as prime minister.
As prime minister, Imran persuaded Bajwa, who was by his side at the time, to remove Munir as ISI chief, and tried to prevent Munir’s appointment as chief, even offering Bajwa an extension in that moment
The circumstances under which Munir was appointed chief did not dispel the impression that he was chosen because he was anti-Imran. Munir’s tenure as lieutenant general was due to end on 25 November 2022, two days before Bajwa’s retirement. The government changed the rules to keep it in service.
This aspect of his appointment may gain importance in the coming days as Imran and Munir prepare to clash again, this time with the army chief clearly on the defensive.
With the Pakistan Army now visibly divided even at the level of corps commanders, what steps Munir takes in the two weeks before Imran’s next court appearance could be crucial to his continued tenure.
There is speculation about a purge against all pro-Imran elements in the Army. The Lahore Corps Commander who held on while his official residence was vandalized was reportedly diverted. There is also talk of a coup against Munir, with a corps commander waiting in the wings to take over. Some in Pakistan see Munir’s long tour of Oman and Qatar — he is still abroad — as a sign of his confidence that he will go; others see it as a tactic to buy time as it weakens.
Among anti-Imran sections of the establishment, there is concern that any admission of weakness by the Army chief at this point will weaken the Army’s institutional power and interests forever, setting a precedent for the street power dictate terms to him.
Imran’s next move
The first sign of a shadow war came from an Islamabad-based Twitter account called The Khorasan Diary that tracks the activities of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. It flagged an alleged statement of support for Imran from Jamaat-ul Ahrar, a breakaway faction of the TTP. Both the TTP and JuA are designated global terrorist groups; The JuA is also said to be linked to the Islamic State-Khorasan.
It remains to be seen how Imran responds to this alleged statement of solidarity by a terrorist group. While in office, he was unpopular for making deals with the TTP. Having won Friday’s round in court, he would be careful to ensure the streets remain calm.
Imran will also surely call immediate elections again. The Supreme Court had ordered the government to hold elections for the Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provincial assemblies on May 14, but there were no signs of them taking place on Sunday. If the court removes the Election Commission or the government for contempt, Imran will get another political opening.
Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s bid to postpone all elections until Imran is disqualified from office, and his reliance on the Army to ensure it, may have run its course.
No democratic moment
The civilians, led by Imran, seem to have won this round, and the army looks weak. But this hardly heralds a moment that will free Pakistan from the rule of the military.
For one, Imran is hardly an advocate of democracy. Creation of the establishment, took possession in 2018 with the help of the military. He was openly contemptuous of Parliament, and rarely attended. What Imran wants is to go back to the hybrid arrangement with a new army chief, where the PTI and the establishment are on the same page again, so that he can continue in office assured that the opposition will not be able to dismiss again .
A true rebalancing of the civil-military relationship in Pakistan will require more fundamental changes, for example, in how the political class views ties with India. The outburst of anger against the army and its symbols after Imran’s arrest is not a fundamental break in the relationship between the people and the army, but only the anger of the people against an army chief .
Pakistan has been here before—when Pervez Musharraf fired the chief justice, judges and lawyers revolted—but as soon as a new chief took over, the relationship was more than restored. The 2008 Mumbai attacks, in which Pakistan’s political class and military joined forces to project their country as the victim and India as the aggressor, completely healed the rift.
As long as India remains the “humsaya dushman mulk” and Kashmir remains the “jugular vein” of Pakistan, the army will continue to rule.
